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ABSTRACT
In a two-party legislature, districts represented by the majority may receive greater funds if majority-party
legislators have greater proposal power or disproportionately form coalitions with each other. Funding
types received by districts may depend on their legislators’ party-identity when party preferences differ.
Estimates from the United States – using fixed-effect and regression-discontinuity designs – indicate
that states represented by members of Congress in the majority receive greater federal grants, especially
in transportation, and defense spending. States represented by Republicans receive more for defense
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Few researchers have examined whether a legislator’s party membership may inﬂuence the kind
or amount of government funds her district receives. Party membership is known to have a strong
effect on the voting behavior of U.S. members of Congress (e.g. Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004;
Albouy 2011), but it is unclear whether party membership inﬂuences actual funding, either because
of ideological differences or because of power imbalances between parties. Existing theories of
distributional politics give little theoretical guidance as to how or why funding might be inﬂuenced
by party membership, and empirical studies have yet to ﬁnd that party membership does make a
difference at the federal level.
This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically how party membership of legislators
in Congress may inﬂuence the distribution of federal funds in the United States. The theoretical
investigation introduces two political parties to the game-theoretic legislative bargaining model
of Baron & Ferejohn (1989) – henceforth ”BF” – enriching the model in a number of signiﬁcant
ways. First, majority status may confer greater proposal, or ”agenda-setting,” power to legislators,
increasing their access to federal funds. Second, if legislators prefer to form voting coalitions
with members of the same party, members of the majority can procure additional funding through
a ”party-coalition” effect, which increases with the majority’s size. Beyond the effects due to
imbalances in bargaining power, differences in ideology, or “taste,” between parties may mean that
a district will receive a different assortment of funding types depending on the party-membership
of its representatives. These taste differences may also explain why members of the same party
prefer forming coalitions with each other.
The theoretical model is applied empirically using a panel data set of states containing in-
formation on congressional representation and federal funding. Because majority control of the
Senate changed several times between 1980 and 2003, it is possible to identify separately the ”bar-
gaining power” effect of having a Senator in the majority from the ”taste” effect of having either
a Republican or Democrat Senator. Meanwhile, control of the House of Representatives only
changed once over this period, making these effects harder to identify separately. Panel estima-
1tion techniques, which control for year and ﬁxed state effects, should make estimates less prone
to omitted-variable bias than simple cross-sectional estimates. Since party control of the majority
is determined nationally, with each state’s representative only having a small chance of affecting
that control, changes in the majority status of legislators can be considered exogenous at the state
level. Furthermore, variation in the size of majority over time help to disentangle agenda-setting
effects, present with even the barest majority, from party-coalition effects, which increase with the
majority’s size. The taste effects of having a Democrat or Republican can be better identiﬁed using
regression-discontinuity estimators, which rely on data taken from candidates who win elections
by small margins. Since such elections are presumably determined with some randomness, these
estimators have quasi-experimental properties.
Estimates reveal that members in the majority are able to procure higher levels of funding for
their states. If a state sends a Senate delegation with both members in the majority, that state should
receive about 2 percent more of government grants – including 5 percent more in transportation
grants – than a state sending a delegation in the minority. Point estimates for the House are similar
to the Senate, albeit less precise. Furthermore, there is some evidence that majority status may
garner considerably higher defense funding. More delicate estimates for the Senate suggest these
effects come more from party-coalition effects than from agenda-setting advantages. This result
implies that so long as majorities in Congress are slim, the distribution of federal funding is only
weakly inﬂuenced by party control of the House or Senate.
The data also provide some support for taste effects. Albeit imprecise, the estimates suggest
that all-Republican delegation in either the House or Senate garners considerably more in defense
funding, as well as in transportation, regardless of their majority-minority status. An all-Democrat
delegation in either chamber procures additional grants for housing and urban development and
possibly for education.
22 Theoretical and Empirical Background
There is already a rich theoretical literature on distributional politics, but little of it addresses the
role of parties. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Riker (1962) predict that partyless legislators
trying to pass spending bills will create minimum-winning coalitions to get these bills passed,
distributing beneﬁts to a bare majority of legislators who approve of the bill. This “majoritar-
ian” prediction re-arises in BF’s non-cooperative bargaining model, which also implies that the
distribution of beneﬁts can be highly skewed towards legislators with greater proposal power. In
congressional politics, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that members of Congress in the majority
hold much greater proposal powers. This argument, together with BF’s theory, should predict that
members of the majority will monopolize federal money in lieu of their greater proposal powers, so
that their districts receive much higher funding than those represented by members of the minority.
This conclusion is at odds with the fact that most spending bills in Congress are passed by
super-majorities with members of both parties, and that the actual distribution of federal funds is
not obviously lopsided heavily towards areas represented by the majority (Mayhew 1974). Wein-
gast (1979) explains this “universalistic” tendency as a result of legislators setting up legislative
“rules of the game” to distribute funds evenly to effectively insure themselves against the risk of
being left outside of any minimum-winning coalition. Thus, in a kind of “meta-game,” legisla-
tors get what they expect from a bargaining situation. In the models of Riker and BF, where all
legislators are ex-ante equal, federal money should be distributed equally.
When legislators come from different parties, they are not ex-ante equal – at least not after
the uncertainty of party-membership has been resolved – as members of the majority party might
expect to receive greater amounts of funding in a bargaining situation. Thus, the rules of the
game may be set up to give majority members a larger fraction of funds to reﬂect the bargaining
advantages they hold. This argument can justify using an amended bargaining model with parties,
taking the expected distribution of funds across different party types as the predicted outcome,
rather than the distribution resulting from a single game. Another dimension worth modeling is
that legislators with different tastes or ideologies may demand different types of funding for their
3home district.
Although the effect of partisan representation on the distribution of federal funds is a subject
of obvious interest, empirical evidence on it is scarce. ¿From cross-sectional estimates, Levitt and
Snyder (1995) conclude that while Democrats held full power in Congress they were able to divert
greater amounts of funds to congressional districts with greater numbers of Democratic voters,
but they do not ﬁnd that representation itself had a signiﬁcant effect on the distribution of federal
funds. Using ﬁxed-effect panel estimates, Levitt and Poterba (1999) ﬁnd that states with senior
Democratic Representatives tended to have higher GDP growth rates than other states, but they
are not able to ﬁnd a link between representation and federal funding levels. Knight (2005) adds
committeestoalegislativebargainingmodel, andestimatesfromcross-sectionaldatathatmembers
of the House Committee on Transportation procure greater amounts of transportation funding for
their districts, but does not ﬁnd any independent effect of party-membership.1
3 A Legislative Bargaining Model with Political Parties
The model below provides two explanations of how legislators in the majority can receive greater
funds. First, by having greater proposal powers; second, by banding together and excluding mi-
nority legislators from accessing available funds.
3.1 Set-up
Suppose that there are N legislators, indexed i = 1;:::;N, where N is a large, odd number.
There are two parties¸A and B, each with NA and NB legislators, and A holds the majority so
that NA > NB. Denote the share of legislators in the majority party as s  NA=N, s 2 (1=2;1].
Take N to be fairly large so that integer concerns can be ignored – they contribute little – and s
can be treated as a continuous variable. The legislature is entrusted with a ﬁxed set of funds of
1Other papers of note include Calvert and Fox (2000), who consider how parties can form in a dynamic bargain-
ing game, and Knight (2004), who looks at how greater bargaining power of Senators from small states affects the
distribution of federal funds.
4size N to distribute, normalized so that there is one unit of funds per legislator. For now, funds are
homogenous. The objective of each legislator is to maximize the amount of funds for their district,
yi.
The legislative bargaining game starts with the recognition of a proposer who proposes an allo-
cation of funds (y1;:::;yN) to the legislature, with
P
yi  N. For this allocation to be instituted, it
must be approved by a majority of legislators. If the proposal does not receive majority approval,
then the total amount of available funds is reduced by the discount factor  2 [0;1], and the game
repeats itself with the choice of a new proposer. Control of the party by the majority is presumed
to hold for the indeﬁnite future, and s is assumed ﬁxed, although similar results would hold if
E (st+1) = st, where t is an index of how many rounds have been played.2
As with BF’s model, the proposer is chosen randomly, except that members of different parties
have different recognition probabilities. The odds of an A-member getting proposal rights relative
to a B-member is given by 1 + ,  2 [ 1;1), where  > 0 implies that A-members have
a greater recognition probability, giving them proposal or ”agenda-setting” advantages. In the
legislature as a whole, the odds that party A gets to propose over party B is (1+)s=(1 s); when
 = 0 the relative odds simply reﬂect the ratio of A-members to B-members, s=(1   s).
The proposer’s goal is to secure enough votes to obtain passage of his proposal while allocating
as much as possible to himself. Because each legislator voting for the allocation must prefer it to
continuing on to the next round, each legislator in the coalition requires a minimum payment of
 times their continuation value, V . The proposer can always propose a passable allocation that
gives her more than her continuation value, and so she will always make a proposal that gets
majority approval. However, since buying votes is costly, the proposer will choose a minimum-
sized coalition of (N   1)=2.
In that coalition, the proposer must decide how many legislators of the same party to include in
her coalition. Let p denote the share of the coalition from party A if an A-member is the proposer,
and q denote the share of the coalition from party A if a B-member is the proposer. If the proposer
2If elections are sufﬁciently independent, then a central limit theorem may hold so that the probability of party A
losing the election is given by ((st   1=2)=) for some , where  is the normal cumulative distribution function.
5picks from both parties evenly, then the share of A-members in a coalition should equal their
overall share: in other words p = q = s. If parties are perfectly cohesive, so that proposers always
choose members of their own party over members of the other party, then A-proposers only choose
A-members in their coalition, so p = 1; B-proposers include all B-members in their coalition, but
must still include a minimum share of A-members to secure a majority of votes: this share of A-
members is q = 2s   1. I modelthe degree of party cohesiveness with a single party-coalition
parameter  2 [ 1;1], where p = s + (1   s) and q = s + (1   s), so that  = 0 corresponds
to the case of no party cohesion and  = 1 corresponds to the case of perfect party cohesion. To
simplify the exposition and empirical implementation of the model, the value of  is an exogenous
parameter, rather than an endogenous parameter shaped by more fundamental factors.
3.2 Solution
An attractive solution for this game is the symmetric stationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
(SSSPNE), as it is unique and depends on a strategy independent of history. Because of the folk
theorem, there are many other non-stationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (see BF). Such
solutionsnotonlyfailto provide auniqueprediction, butdependoncomplicatedhistory-dependent
strategies, often obscuring the most plausible bargaining forces. The SSSPNE seems to reveal
the most fundamental ways that party-membership can inﬂuence the distribution of funds in a
bargaining context.
In the SSSPNE, the continuation values of each legislator type, VA and VB, are independent
of time and depend only on the parameters s;;;. Because payoffs depend only on the amount
of funds received and are independent of time, the continuation values give what each legislator
expects to receive on average from a given game, i.e., E(yA) = VA, or invoking the law of large
numbers, how much each legislator should receive over many repeated games. Taking this into
account and that there is one unit of available funds per legislator, the federal budget constraint is
sVA + (1   s)VB = 1 (1)
6VA is determined by a bargaining condition set by the structure of the bargaining process and
the incentives of legislators when either type proposes:
 With probability (1+)s=(1+s) an A-member proposes. In this case, A-members receive
all funds except for the funds given to B-members, each of which receives  times VB to
secure their vote. The number of B-members in the coalition, as a fraction of the legislature,
is given by (1   )(1   s)=2.
 With probability (1   s)=(1 + s) a B-member proposes. In this case the fraction of the
legislature of A-members in the coalition is given by [s   (1   s)]=2. For their vote, each
A-member receives a payment of  times VA.
Adding these two situations together, the fraction of total funds that all members of party A may













s   (1   s)
2
 VA. (2)
Combining (2) with the budget constraint (1) and solving, the ratio of funds going to an A-member
relative to a B-member is the product of two terms:
VA
VB
= (1 + ) 
(2=   1) + 
(2=   1) + (1   s)=s
: (3)
The ﬁrst term, (1 + ); refers to the amount of additional funds A-members procure because
of their agenda-setting advantages. Since proposers always include themselves in their own coali-
tions, getting to propose more often entitles a legislator to more funds.
The second term, [(2=   1) + ]=[(2=   1) + (1   s)=s], refers to the amount of additional
funds A-members procure because of party-coalition advantages. This advantage occurs because
A-members tend to vote together and, because they are more numerous, spend less to buy the votes
of B-members than B proposers spend to buy the votes of A-members. This party-coalition effect
is increasing in  and, if  > 0, decreasing in . It vanishes to one as s approaches 1=2, as party B
7has to buy fewer votes from party A. It also disappears as  approaches zero, as it becomes costlier
to delay approving a proposal, making votes cheaper to buy from the opposing party.
While the above derivation is heuristic, the solution corresponds to the distribution that arises
when the proposer takes all the gains from proposal power for herself using a game-theoretic
derivation presented in Appendix A. More generally, the result in (3) also applies if the gains to
agenda-setting are split within the party, either uniformly, or within a group or committee within
the party, so long as all agenda-setting gains are kept within the proposing party. Furthermore, this
solution also applies to cases when the winning coalition is oversized – i.e. bigger than (N 1)=2 –
if all additional coalition members belong to the proposing party. The results are robust so long as
members of the non-proposing party in the coalition receive only  times their continuation value
V .
3.3 The Role of Tastes Over Funding Types
Party-speciﬁc ideology or ”taste” effects on the composition of funds can be modeled when funds
comeindifferenttypes, andA-membershavedifferentpreferencesforthesetypesthanB-members.
Theories of electoral competition (e.g. Downs 1957) predict that legislators must procure the kind
of funds preferred by the median voter of their district in order to get elected. This result can break
down if they are unable to credibly commit to policies during an election (Alesina 1988) or ﬁnd
it more advantageous to appeal to their base supporters than to the median voters of their district
(Cox and McCubbins 1988). With legislators liking different types of funding, the proposer will
ﬁnd it least costly to buy votes if she gives each coalition member the type they most prefer. This
alone would produce differences in the allocation of funds across districts by party.
Asymmetries in funding types across parties can also occur if there are constraints on the types
of funds that can be used in a proposal. Such constraints could be due to legislative protocol or
indivisibilities in funded projects. For instance, say that a proposal must consist of only one type
of funding, that the bargaining game is repeated a large number of times, and that the proposer
chooses the type of funding for the proposal. If  > 0, then proposers will disproportionately
8choose members of their own party in their coalitions. Then, mechanically, funding in districts
represented by the same party will be more similar than funding in districts represented by different
parties. The stronger one party’s taste for a certain type of fund, parametrized by, say, , the more
one party should receive it relative to the other.
If tastes are correlated within parties, possibly for ideological reasons, taste differences can
also explain why members of the same party form coalitions with each other in the ﬁrst place. For
example, if proposals must consist of the same kind of fund, then it becomes more ”costly” to buy
the votes of members of the other party: opposite-party members would rather wait in the hopes
that a member of their own party gets to propose the type of funding they like more. In this case,
the party-coalition parameter  can become a function of the more fundamental taste parameter ,
where a higher value of  supports a higher value of .3 Unfortunately, formally modeling  as
a function of taste differences produces little additional insight at the cost of much lengthier and
more opaque mathematics, and so no formal results are given here.4
3.4 Other Extensions
A number of other extensions may be added to the legislative model. First of all, the relative
distribution of funds predicted by (3) could arise in a meta-game in the manner of Weingast (1979),
whereby legislators set up the ”rules of the game” so that they get the expected outcome of the
bargaining game without actually playing it. Since in the actual game, some legislators are left
out of the winning coalition and get no funds, risk-averse legislators would rather prefer a certain
payoff over an uncertain one with the same expected value. In practice, this means that we need
not observe actual legislators bargaining in the manner described above. Rather, the above model
constitutes a ”threat point” that legislators bear in mind when setting up their rules. If the rules
3Knight (2002) explains a related model with different tastes for public goods. If there are absolutely no taste
differences, and proposers do not care at all about parties, then competition to be included in the proposer’s coaltion
should drive VA down to the level of VB. This means that  is determined endogenously as a function of the parameters
s;;and , and takes a negative value, so that the right-hand side of equation (3) equals one.
4Jackson and Moselle (2002) propose an interesting model of legislative party formation due to heterogeneity in
preferences over general- interest issues as well as distributional ones.
9are broken, legislators could resort to this kind of aggressive bargaining situation. If the rules are
followed, they will lead to similar outcomes on average, albeit through very different behavior.
Second, the framework here does not allow the proposal to be immediately amended before
being up for vote: this amounts to what BF call a “closed rule.” BF show that adoption of an “open
rule,” which allows other legislators to amend the proposal before it is subject to vote, reduces
the inequality of funding between agenda-setter and others in the coalition, although those outside
the coalition still receive zero. In a large legislature with no parties, winning coalitions still have
minimum size, but the amount going to the proposer is much closer to what a typical coalition
member receives.5
It is also assumed that party in the majority retains that status indeﬁnitely. If the minority party
B has some positive probability of gaining power in the future, this should raise the minority’s
share, VB, relative to the majority’s share, VA. One could also imagine a dynamic game similar to
Dixit et al. (2000) where parties can gain and lose majorities, and punish each other for breaking
an implicit contract to be fair to each other. With smaller majorities, A-members may want to
split funds more evenly with B-members for fear that if they lose the majority in the next election
they will be punished by B-members for distributing funds unevenly. With larger majorities, A-
members may distribute funds more unevenly, since they are less at risk of losing power and being
punished. Such a scenario would mean that funds will be distributed more unevenly with a larger
s, much as with party-coalition effects, possibly confounding the two effects empirically.6
5Modeling an open rule in a legislature with parties is quite complicated, although a plausible conjecture can be
made. It seems that an open rule should reduce the majority party’s agenda-setting advantage, as expressed by 1 + 
in equation (3), if the party’s recognition probability in the amendment stage is lower than its recognition probability
in the initial proposal stage.
6Certain gains from legislative bargaining may not actually take the form of distributed federal funds. For example,
they could take the form of taxes or regulations which differentially beneﬁt ﬁrms or workers in certain areas, or even
general-interest legislation with strong local support.
104 Empirical Model
The effect of partisan representation on federal funding across states is modeled empirically using
two different equations. The ﬁrst takes on a log-linear form; the second, a structural form inspired
by equation (3), that can be used to disentangle agenda-setting effects from party-coalition effects.
Either equation can include a ﬂexible control function for the vote-share going to the Republican
(or Democratic) candidate, to produce regression-discontinuity, or ”RD,” estimates, which improve
identiﬁcation.
4.1 Simple Linear Model
To aid intuition, consider a log-linear equation for funds in a district with a single representative.
Let the logarithm of some funds per capita yjt in district j at time t depend on whether its legislator
is in the majority, indicated by Mjt, is a Republican, indicated by Rjt, other observed variables Xjt,
state effects j, year effects t, and an error component "jt:
yjt = Mjt + Rjt + Xjt + j + t + "jt, (4)
where  is a reduced-form parameter summarizing the bargaining advantages conferred by ma-
jority power, and  is a parameter indicating how strongly Republicans get this funding over
Democrats, with  > 0 reﬂecting a Republican taste-effect, and  < 0, a Democratic one. De-
note the share of Republicans as rt = (1=N)
PN
i=1 Rjt; then t = I(rt > 0:5) indicates when
Republicans control the majority. Majority status of a single legislator is then
Mjt = tRjt + (1   t)(1   Rjt): (5)
11The Republican identity of the legislator from state j at time t is a function of the fraction of the
two-party vote share won by the Republican candidate in the most recent election, vjt:
Rjt = I(vjt > 0:5) (6)
This function is essentially deterministic as post-election party switches are very rare (Snyder and
Ting 2002).
4.2 Identiﬁcation and Regression Discontinuity
Several assumptions identify the parameters  and  in a linear regression. First, assume that
conditional on year effects, t, and other observables, the party holding the majority, indicated by




where Wjt = [Xjt;j;t]. The rationale for the second equality is that the party holding the major-
ity is determined nationally, not locally. After conditioning out the year effect, t, which controls
for large national swings in spending due to power changes, it is safe to take t as exogenous to "jt,
especially as the probability of any one district determining majority control is very small. With
this assumption, and absent collinearity problems, an unbiased estimate of  may be identiﬁed
with a standard regression.
Since Republican status is a function of the observable vote share vjt it follows automatically
that
E["jtjRjt;Wjt;vjt] = E["jtjWjt;vjt] (7)
In this case,  can be estimated without bias using a control function for E["jtjWjt;vjt], which
12is assumed to take the additive form Wjt + f(vjt), where  is a vector and f is a smooth non-
linear function of vote-share. Including f() in the regression equation amounts to adopting an
RD estimator.7 If a control function for vote-share is not included, identiﬁcation of  requires a
stronger identiﬁcation assumption that the error term is mean independent of R conditional on W:
E["jtjRjt;Wjt;vjt] = E["jtjWjt] (8)
This model correspond to the ﬁxed-effects, or ”FE,” panel estimator, which is identiﬁed off of
within-district correlations between representation and funding over time, controlling for Wjt.8
Although it requires fewer identiﬁcation assumptions, the RD estimator does have some disad-
vantages. In the case where f (vjt) = 0, the RD estimator is less efﬁcient than the FE estimator
since it puts more weight on legislators who win close elections. Second, districts with close elec-
tions may not represent all districts, such as if greater electoral competition induces representatives
with weak reelection chances to seek funding different from representatives in safer seats.
4.3 Applying the Model to Congress
Generalizing the one-legislator-per-district model to the Congressional representation of states in-
troduces complications. First, there are two chambers in Congress: the House of Representatives,
representing congressional districts, and the Senate, representing states. To be enacted, legislation
must get majority approval in each chamber. Theoretically, it is unclear how having two cham-
bers should affect funding patterns. One possibility is that distributional differences may simply
be added up cumulatively from two independent bargaining processes. Another possibility is that
there are important interactions between the two parties that need to be modeled. Using a partyless,
two-chamber legislative bargaining model, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) conclude that differences in
7This estimator has been used in several political applications, including the effect of incumbency on election
chances (Lee 2006), how electoral competition affects the voting behavior of Congressmen (Lee, Moretti, and Butler
2004), and the effect of Congressional district size and tenure on the allocation of funds (Falk, 2005).
8In small samples, where the number of changes in t is small, the RD estimator can also help in estimating  by
better controlling for the taste effect in .
13voting power in one chamber do not automatically translate into differences in expected payoffs,
but this possibility requires putting strict restrictions on one chamber’s proposal or amendment
rights, restrictions which do not seem ﬁtting when Congress determines funding across areas.
Another complication is that states each have two Senators, each of whom may be of different
parties. Supposedly, if both Senators are of the same party, then their ideological as well as dis-
tributive interests should be aligned, and the Senators should vote together. If both Senators are of
different parties, then it is plausible that party effects may cancel out. A natural generalization of
the single-representative model is to instead use  MS
jt, the share of state j’s Senate delegation in the
majority, and  RS
jt = t  MS
jt, the share of the delegation that is Republican.9
Third, each district has only a single Representative, but most states contain multiple districts.
As demonstrated in Appendix B, when funding data at the district level is aggregated at the state
level, it is sensible to use the variables  MH
jt and  RH
jt, denoting the shares of a state j’s House
delegation that are in the majority and Republican. The resulting equation, which allows effects to

















jt ) + Xjt + j + t + "jt (9)
where f(vS1
jt ;vS2
jt ) is a ﬂexible polynomial in the vote share of each Senator, and thus consistent
estimates for their effects depend on an identiﬁcation assumption similar to (7). Because of data
limitations, and the variable number of Representatives per state, vote shares for Representatives
are not included, and thus estimates for H require a stronger identiﬁcation assumption, similar
to (8). In practice, including Senate vote shares has only a small effect on the estimates, which
suggests that (8) is an appropriate identiﬁcation condition.10
9With a sufﬁciently large data set it would be possible to test for heterogeneous effects, whereby, say, the effect
of having two majority Senators is different than twice the effect of having only one majority Senator. An interesting
paper by Snyder et al. (2005) argues that when legislators have different voting weights – or equivalently vote in
blocks – that one should expect a linear relationship between voting power and funds received, theoretically justifying
the linear model used here.
10Additional terms, such as IMSMH, could be added to (9) to test for interaction effects between chambers
through I, although this requires more of the data. Another term that can be included would interact party identity
with majority status, e.g. MSRS, in case majority effects are larger with one party than with the other. A more
restrictive, but potentially more powerful model restricting H = S and H = S can also be estimated. This was
14Inaddition, thespeciﬁcationconsidershowthePresident’spartyaffectstheallocationoffederal
funds. The President proposes a Budget to Congress, arguably giving her agenda-setting powers,
has limited veto power over proposals passed by Congress. These powers could be used either to
reduce or increase the dispersion of federal funds across areas. Presumably, a President may try
to target funds to areas providing greater electoral support, to swing-vote areas, or to areas with
Congressionalrepresentationinthesameparty(McCarty2000). Thislatterpossibilityisaccounted
for by adding variables for the proportion of the Senate and House delegations that are of the same
party as the President.
4.4 Structural Model of Majority Effects
If the theoretical model in section 3 describes congressional reality, then it is possible to estimate
parameters describing agenda-setting and party-coalition effects that confer majority advantages.
Assuming that legislators are very patient, i.e.  = 1, then from (3), yjt = Mjtfln(1+)+ln[(1+
)=(1 + (1   st)=st)]g. The non-linear term in brackets may be approximated by the linear term
Mjt[ + (st   0:5)], where   (1 + ), and st   0:5 measures the degree of supermajority.
Allowing for other variables to inﬂuence funding leads to a linear regression equation with an
interaction term:
yjt = Mjt + 
Mjt(st   0:5) + Rjt + Xjt + j + t + "jt, (10)
where the party-coalition effect is given by
 =
p
1=4 +    1=2. (11)
When  and  are both free,  is identiﬁed off of overall higher levels of funding in majority-
represented districts, while  is identiﬁed off of how much funding increases in those districts with
the supermajority size st   0:5. The case of  = 0, (10) reduces to the simple linear model in (4)
done in a previous draft, but is omitted here for brevity. Estimates are available from the author on request.
15with   .11
5 Data Description and Outcome Variables
The effect of majority status and party afﬁliation on funding is examined using state-level data
on members of Congress and federal funds. Congressional elections data are from Congressional
Quarterly and are available back to 1968 for the House, and 1914 for the Senate. Federal funding
data are primarily from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), which begin with the 1983
ﬁscal year (abbreviated “FY”). The budget for a ﬁscal year is passed by the Congress in session
in the preceding year. Thus, the FY1983 budget was passed in 1982 by members of Congress who
were elected in 1980. Federal funding data on a few programs, such as transportation, are available
back to 1971 from the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds (GDFF), and defense spending
data for contracts and salaries are available back to 1952 and 1959, respectfully, from the Statistical
Abstracts of the United States. Other data on the characteristics of state population used for time-
varying controls are from the U.S. Census yearly population counts. These include percent of the
population that is female, 65 or over, 14 or under, black, other non-white, and living in an urban
area. Decennial Census data on median income and median home value are interpolated linearly
to produce yearly observations.
The level of observation used is the state. An advantage of using this level is that federal
funding by state is cleanly measured. Federal funding by congressional district is much more
subject to error as federal funds are less visible below the state level, especially at the sub-county
level. This creates a serious problem since the boundaries of counties and of congressional districts
often intersect. Changes in congressional district boundaries over time further complicate the
problem of assigning funds at the district level. Partly for this reason, funding data by state for
some programs are available further back than FY1983, while no such data exists for congressional
11In principle the non-linear model could be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques, such as non-linear
least squares. Because of data limitations it is difﬁcult to identify both  and  at the same time. Setting  = 1 makes
the model highly linear, precluding the need for more complicated, and less numerically stable, non-linear estimation.
16districts. In addition, some funding allocations within-state, such as for state capitals, is actually
distributed by other areas in the state. A disadvantage of using state-level rather than district-level
data is that there are far fewer states than districts.
As shown in Figure 1, majority control of the Senate changed ﬁve times between FY1982 and
FY2004, allowing for majority effects to be identiﬁed separately from party taste effects rather
well. In the House, majority control changed only once, from Democrat to Republican for FY1996
(after the 1994 election), making it more difﬁcult to disentangle taste from majority effects. The
period of frequent power changes in the Senate has been a period of small majorities, so that
changes in st have not been large, making it difﬁcult to identify  separately from  with equation
(10).
While the majority effect is identiﬁed off of national changes in who controls the majority, the
taste effect on funding is identiﬁed off of changes in representation within states. These changes
for the Senate are seen in Figure 2a, which documents how frequently Senate seats for a state have
switched parties between FY1983 and FY2004, and Figure 2b, which documents whether the seats
have become more Democratic or Republican. Similar changes for the House are shown in Figures
3a and 3b. Certain areas such as the South have grown more Republican, while the Paciﬁc Coast
and the Northeast have become more Democratic, although there is considerable variation even
within region. Furthermore, changes in the House and Senate, while correlated, exhibit enough
independence to allow separate identiﬁcation of House and Senate effects.
Characteristics of federal funding per capita from the CFFR are given in Table 1. Column
1 reports total government spending, which includes government grants, salaries and wages of
federal employees, procurement contracts, as well as direct payments to individuals, such as Social
Security and Medicare coverage. Column 2 reports all spending on defense, mainly in the form of
contracts, wages, and salaries. Column 3 refers to government grants, which are split into types in
columns 4 through 8 according to the department handling them:
 DepartmentofTransportation, e.g. HighwayPlanning&Construction, AirportImprovement
Program, Urban Mass Transportation Capital Improvement Grants;
17 Department of Education, e.g. Educationally Deprived Children-Local Educational Agen-
cies, Handicapped-State Grants;
 Department of Housing and Urban Development, e.g. Lower Income Housing Assistance -
Section 8); and
 Department of Health and Human Services, e.g. Medicaid, CHIP, Social Services Block
Grant, Foster Care Title IV-E, Head Start.
Grants for remaining departments, including the Department of Agriculture, are grouped into the
”Other” category.
The ﬁrst row shows how much the federal government spent per capita in each category in
FY2004. Total defense spending took up 16.4 percent of spending, or $987 per capita, of which
about 60 percent is in procurement contracts, and 40 percent in wages and salaries. Government
grants accounted for 25 percent of federal spending, at $1,534 per capita, with $163 spent on
transportation, $127 on education, $112 on urban development, and $902 on health and human
services.
The next rows give more information about how these funding levels vary across years and
states. It displays the standard deviation in real (CPI-deﬂated) funding per capita across states
over time, both unadjusted, and after controlling for state and year effects, and time-varying de-
mographic and income controls. The latter provides a gauge of how much remaining variation
is potentially explainable by congressional representation. Defense spending exhibits substantial
raw variation; although this series is fairly well predicted by the controls, its residual variation still
leaves much to be explained. Total government grants are even better predicted by the controls,
although transportation, and to a lesser extent housing and urban development, exhibit substantial
residual variation.
186 Empirical Results
6.1 Testing Multiple Hypotheses
Beforeproceeding, itisscientiﬁcallyimportanttohypothesizeinadvancewhateffectsareexpected
in the empirical analysis. Failure to do so opens the analysis to the criticism that statistical signiﬁ-
cance levels are overstated when multiple hypotheses are tested at once — see Cook and Farewell
(1996). The effect of majority status should be reﬂected by  > 0 in total defense spending and
total grants, especially transportation grants, which are particularly apt to political manipulation
(Crain and Oakley 1995). In American politics, Democrats have historically preferred federal in-
volvement in education, urban development, and welfare spending (Kurian 1997a), and thus it is
plausible to hypothesize  < 0 for those types of grants. Republicans, on the other hand, are known
to support high levels of defense spending (Kurian 1997b), and thus it is most plausible to hypoth-
esize  > 0. Fordham (2007) documents how this support has grown since the mid-1960s from
Congressional Republican voting behavior.
As a second precaution, I report two sets of p-values: the ﬁrst set of p-values consider each
hypothesis in isolation, as is standard; the second set of p-values control for the false discovery
rate for multiple tests, using the technique described in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). A re-
ported p-value of X, means that the hypothesis can be accepted (not rejected) if one is willing to
allow X percent of true null hypotheses (of zero effect) to be rejected by accident. This method re-
quires grouping the hypotheses together in families – for a related exercise see Kling et al. (2007).
Majority effects and taste effects are separate hypotheses to be tested independently. With the
available data, the Senate variables are expected to be more powerful and better-identiﬁed than the
House variables, and should also be considered separately. Additionally, the two aggregate spend-
ing categories, defense and total grants are separated from the ﬁve disaggregated grant categories.
Thus, four families of hypotheses are considered for majority effects, four for party effects, and an
additional four for presidential effects.12
12To compute the Benjamini-Hochberg p-values, the single-hypothesis p-values are ranked p1 < p2 < ::: < pK,
where K is the number of hypotheses in the family. The adjusted p-values are calculated recursively as p
K = pK,
19There are reasons to not be too conservative in interpreting the results. It is unlikely that
funding adjusts instantaneously to changes in congressional power: most funding is determined by
previous legislation, and current legislation may operate with a lag beyond the next ﬁscal year, and
so ﬁnding any result is remarkable. Furthermore, each chamber provides a setting to test a given
hypothesis, and when each chamber reinforces it, this provides considerably stronger evidence.
6.2 Estimates of the Linear Congressional Model
Using funding data from 1983 to 2004, Table 2 presents estimates using the linear model in (9)
for total government grants in Panel A, and total defense spending in Panel B. All speciﬁcations
include state and year effects, columns 2 and above include ﬂexible polynomials in both Senators’
vote shares, and column 3 adds interacted region-by-year effects, using the 4 Census regions, while
column 4 adds interacted division-by-year effects, using the 9 Census divisions. Estimates in the
ﬁrst two rows of Panel A reveal that delegations in the majority increase the federal grants a state
receives by approximately 2 percent; in 2004, this translates to about $30 per capita per year for
each full delegation in the majority. The effects are only highly signiﬁcant for the Senate, and
only until division-by-year effects are added in column 4. However, this set of controls is very
conservative as it removes considerable variation from the data: it is remarkable that the point
estimate is still closer to 2 percent than to zero.
In Panel B, the point estimates reveal positive majority effects on defense spending, although
the effects are only signiﬁcant for the House with region- or division-by-year effects. In the third
and fourth rows of Panel B there is some evidence of large Republican taste effects on defense
spending: although imprecise, the estimates are on the order of 9 percent per delegation, or $90
per capita.
ThispresidentialinteractionappearstobequiteimportantintheHouseforgrants, wherehaving
a delegation of the President’s party increases total grants by 4.5 percent, almost identical to the
p
k = minfp
k+1;(K=k)pkg for k = K 1;:::;1. As shown in Fernando et al. (2004), this test is robust to correlations
among hypotheses.
20effect found in Berry et al. (2009) using district-level data, albeit using a somewhat different
measure of federal funds. The effects for the Senate remain uncertain, and no such effects for
either house appear in defense spending.
Table 3 breaks down government grants by type using the favored speciﬁcation controlling
for vote share polynomials and interacted region-by-year effects. In column 1 with transportation
grants, we see evidence of majority effects around 5 percent, or $8 per capita, in both the House
and Senate, although only the latter is signiﬁcant. Majority effects for other types of funds in the
Senate appear largely insigniﬁcant, especially when multiple hypothesis p-values are used, except
for urban development. Majority effects in the House are hard to detect since party control only
changed once, but the estimate for Health & Human Services raises suspicions. It is worth noting
that none of the point estimates of majority effects in Tables 2 or 3 are negative, and thus are
somewhat supportive of majority effects.
The third and fourth rows of Table 3 show some evidence in favor of taste effects. In both
the House and Senate, a Democratic delegation brings in roughly 13 percent more in housing
and urban development grants, or $14 per capita. The Democratic effects on education grants
are considerably weaker and less precise, but suggest an increase of 3 percent, or $4 per capita,
per Democratic delegation. There is also considerable evidence for Republican taste effects for
transportation grants, particularly in the House. There is also support for the hypothesis that House
Republicans bring in more grants from the ”Other” category, which includes agricultural subsidies.
Weaker evidence suggests that Senate Republicans may bring in more in terms of Health and
Human Services grants, which is surprising as its main component, Medicaid, is generally thought
of as a Democratic program.13
It is worth noting that the regression-discontinuity estimates in column 2 are not much different
from the regular ﬁxed-effect estimates in column 1. This stability gives additional credibility to
the strong identiﬁcation condition (8), in that assuming it does not lead considerable bias, while
it makes more efﬁcient use of the data than (7). Visual comparisons of the plain ﬁxed-effect and
13No signiﬁcant relationships are found for other funding variables such as Social Security and Medicare spending.
This is reassuring for the empirical model since such spending is not easily manipulable across states year-to-year.
21regression-discontinuity estimates are given in Figure 4, which graphs how defense and urban-
development funding residuals, conditioning out the controls, vary with the vote-share going to
the Republican candidate in the previous election.14 To the left of the 50 percent vote share, the
long-dashed lines represent the average for states represented by Democrats, and to the right, for
Republicans. The difference between the two lines corresponds to the ﬁxed-effect estimate. The
short-dashed curve represents the quartic ﬁt of residual funding on the vote-share. The difference
at the 50 percent mark corresponds to the RD estimate. Besides indicating that the results are
signiﬁcant, the graphs show that once the controls are conditioned on, election vote shares predict
little in terms of federal funding patterns away from the discontinuity.
As the data for transportation grants go back to 1971, the stability of the estimate for  over
time can be examined by graphing how the ﬁxed-effects estimates change as the sample period
changes. Figure 5a does this using a 20-year moving window using a combined-chamber estimate,
restricting H = S. It shows the the positive effect of majority status on transportation grants
received is fairly stable over time, although is slightly stronger towards the beginning and end of
the period. Defense-spending data is also available for this longer period: ﬁxed-effect estimates of
 from a 20-year moving panel, shown in Figure 5b, reveal that this positive Republican effect has
grown stronger and more signiﬁcant over time — consistent with the rising Republican support of
defense spending since the 1960s.15 Viewed from the present, the Republican taste-effect estimates
in Table 2 may be biased downwards as they average in earlier data from when this effect is weaker.
Overall, the evidence for majority and taste effects is only moderately strong, as the panel is
of limited length, and the number of party-control changes are few. Yet, the fact that the point
estimates are consistently in the right direction and sometimes signiﬁcant, even when accounting
for two-way clustering and multiple hypotheses, provide assurance that these effects may indeed
be real.
14In Figure 5 the unit of observation is not the state, but the Senate seat, meaning that there are two observations per
state.
15Results using the Senate only, possible because of longer elections data, reveal that the defense-spending effect
was once positive for Democrats in the early 1960s.
226.3 Estimates of the Structural Model
Estimates for the linearized version of the structural model for majority effects in (10) are reported
in Table 4. These are modeled for the Senate using total grants, transportation grants, and defense
spending, where the linear estimates are signiﬁcant and fairly precise. In all of the speciﬁcations,
the estimated agenda-setting effects, , are small and statistically insigniﬁcant, meaning that ma-
jority effects are small when control of the Senate is slight. The estimated party-coalition effects,
 – inferred from the coefﬁcient on the degree of supermajority, , through (11) – are positive
and generally signiﬁcant, as funding gains for the majority grow with the degree of supermajority.
According to the structural model, this is due to strong party-coalition effects, although other struc-
tural explanations, such as the one posited by Dixit et al. (2000), remain possibilities. Whatever
the case, majority effects appear to be strong only when the degree of supermajority is large.
7 Conclusion
The case that members of Congress in the majority have advantages in procuring federal funds for
their state has both theoretical and empirical support. The evidence is strongest in the case of the
Senate, where majority-represented states receive, on average, $180 million more in grants (using
2004 numbers), or $90 million per Senator, of which $50 million is in transportation grants. In the
House, there is some evidence that majority delegations are able to procure around $600 million
in defense spending. Given that the House majority has greater party discipline and agenda-setting
advantages (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), perhaps future researchers will ﬁnd majority effects
are larger in the House when more data become available.
There is also empirical evidence for partisan taste effects on the distribution of funds for a
number of categories. As might be expected given current partisan leanings, each Republican del-
egation procures roughly $500 million extra spending in defense relative to its Democratic coun-
terpart. In compensation, each Democratic delegation procures about $80 million more for urban
development and possibly $20 million for education. The evidence that transportation and other
23grants go disproportionately towards areas with House Republicans is interesting and somewhat
surprising. Given the novelty of these results, further research on these effects seems warranted; al-
ready, Reingeweitz (2011) has estimated the ﬁscal multiplier on state income from partisan effects,
although using a notably different empirical model. It would also be worth analyzing whether or
not it is efﬁcient for voters for federal funds to respond to the party-membership of their legislative
representation.
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28Appendix
A Formal Derivation of Equation (2)
The legislature contains N members indexed i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng = N. The parties are modeled as
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive sets A and B, A [ B = N and A \ B = ?, with
jAj = NA and jBj = NB. The payoff a legislator receives from a distribution depends on her own
share, and is discounted
Ui (y;t) = 
tyi
where  2 [0;1) is a discount factor and t 2 f0;1;2;:::g is the number of periods which have
elapsed. Continuation values for an individual i at time t is given by Vi (g;t) where g is the
subgame. As shown in BF, the number of possible subgame-perfect equilibria in this game is
inﬁnite. The focus here is on SSSPNE, so that continuation values do not vary with t or with
g. Given that with two types of legislators, in a stationary game there should be two types of
continuation values, one for A-members, VA, and one for B-members, VB: the only break in
symmetry is with party afﬁliation.
The game begins by having nature randomly choose one member of the legislature as the
proposer. The chance of a proposal going to an A-member is s(1 + )=(1 + s): The proposal
strategy in this case resembles very much that in BF, with members of the coalition receiving 
times their continuation value, those outside the coalition receiving nothing, and the agenda setter
receiving the remainder of funds not given to others. In order to pass a winning allocation that
procures himself the maximum funds, the agenda-setter proposes




= VB for (1   p)
N   1
2




 fpVA + (1   p)VBg for the proposer
= 0 for other members of A and B
When B-members propose, with probability (1 s)=(1+s), the allocation looks identical except
with q replacing p.
Taking these proposal strategies into consideration, and working out the proper probabilities,



































































Replacing p = s + (1   s) and q = s   (1   s) produces equation (2).
B Formal Derivation of Equation (9)































jt refer to the majority and Republican status of Senator l 2 f1;2g in state j, where
each Senator is assumed to have the same linear effects on state spending, S=2 and S=2, with
no interaction. MH
jdt and RH
jdt refer to the majority and Republican status of the Representative
of district d. XS
jt and XH
jdt refer to state and district-level time-varying covariates, S
j and H
jd
to state and district-level ﬁxed effects, and t to year effects. These last variables are condensed









Conditioning on all of the covariates, as well as the majorty status of the parties in each cham-




































by the same arguments made in section 4.2 that majority status depends on party identiﬁcation
combined with exogenous party control (conditioning on time effects), and that party identiﬁcation




















which is a stronger assumption for the House than the Senate since we do not condition on vote
shares for House seats. This equation motivates adding a ﬂexible polynomial in Senate vote shares
into the district-level equation (A.1). Averaging over districts by state, with yjt = (1=Nj)
P
d yjdt,











































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Per-Capita Spending Levels in 2004
Mean $7,107 $987 $1,534 $163 $127 $112 $902 $243
Fraction of Govt Spending 100.0% 16.4% 25.5% 2.7% 2.1% 1.9% 15.0% 4.0%
Panel B: Unadjusted Standard Deviations of Logarithms: Unweighted average of all states, 1983-2004
Log Std. Dev 0.20 0.75 0.35 0.43 0.38 0.54 0.46 0.43
Panel C: Regression-Adjusted Standard Deviation of Logarithms
Log Std. Dev 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.18 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.12
R











Federal spending data taken from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report and partitioned according to object and
CFDA program code. Controls for regression adjustment include year and state fixed effects; log of population, level
and squared; percent of population over 65, under 14, female, black, of other race, and in an urban area; median
household income and home value. Real values calculated for standard deviation of logarithms using the CPI.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
State Delegation in Congress
Majority Share in Senate β
S 0.026 0.025 0.021 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.020
(std. error) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
p-value single hyp. 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.42
p-value multiple hyp. 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.31 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.42
Majority Share in House β
H 0.024 0.016 0.021 0.018 0.073 0.086 0.127 0.138
(std. error) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.052) (0.052) (0.064) (0.071)
p-value single hyp. 0.24 0.44 0.22 0.28 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.05
p-value multiple hyp. 0.24 0.44 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.10
Republican Share in Senate θ
S 0.004 0.009 0.021 0.017 0.077 0.127 0.092 0.092
(std. error) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.063) (0.059) (0.055) (0.057)
p-value single hyp. 0.72 0.59 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.03 0.10 0.11
p-value multiple hyp. 0.72 0.59 0.15 0.18 0.44 0.07 0.15 0.18
Republican Share in House θ
H 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.018 0.129 0.165 0.066 0.091
(std. error) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.095) (0.102) (0.075) (0.089)
p-value single hyp. 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.34 0.18 0.11 0.38 0.31
p-value multiple hyp. 0.19 0.11 0.38 0.34 0.19 0.11 0.38 0.34
Presid. Party Match in Senate 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.018 0.017 0.014
(std. error) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
p-value single hyp. 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.22 0.81 0.64 0.65 0.70
p-value multiple hyp. 0.19 0.29 0.22 0.44 0.81 0.64 0.65 0.70
Presid. Party Match in House 0.046 0.045 0.042 0.036 -0.013 -0.011 0.001 0.016
(std. error) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
p-value single hyp. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.71 0.75 0.98 0.67
p-value multiple hyp. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.71 0.75 0.98 0.67
State Fixed Effects XXXX XXX X
Year Fixed Effects XXXX XXX X
Senate RD X X X X X X
Region-by-Year Effects X X X X
Division-by-Year Effects X X
Panel A: Total Govt Grants Panel B: Total Defense
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
Robust standard errors clustered by state and year in brackets. Sample consists of 50 states over 22 years for 1983-2004 for 1,100 total observations.
All regressions include state dummies and year dummies; demographic controls: log of population, level and squared; percent of population over 65,
under 14, female, black, of other race. and in an urban area; income controls: median household income and home value; tenure controls: average
tenure of congressmen and average in second or later term (separately for House and Senate). Significance of multiple hypotheses determined using
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method. Total grants and defense spending grouped as a family of hypotheses. "Senate RD" includes a quartic in the
two-party vote share going to each Republican Senate candidate, with extra dummies for a vote share of zero and a vote share of one. Region-by-year
effects interact 4 region dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) with each year dummy. Division-by-year effects interact 9 division dummies
(New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atantic, East North Central, West North Central, East Souch Central, West South Central, Mountain, and
Pacific).
TABLE 2: EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION ON AMOUNT OF FEDERAL FUNDS TO STATESDependent Variable
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
State Delegation in Congress
Majority Share in Senate β
S 0.054 0.001 0.018 0.005 0.008
(std. error) (0.021) (0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
p-value single hyp. 0.01 0.91 0.11 0.74 0.59
p-value multiple hyp. 0.05 0.91 0.28 0.91 0.91
Majority Share in House β
H 0.045 0.002 0.016 0.043 0.008
(std. error) (0.037) (0.014) (0.026) (0.020) (0.030)
p-value single hyp. 0.22 0.90 0.52 0.04 0.78
p-value multiple hyp. 0.54 0.90 0.87 0.18 0.90
Republican Share in Senate θ
S 0.025 -0.032 -0.155 0.047 0.014
(std. error) (0.055) (0.019) (0.048) (0.028) (0.042)
p-value single hyp. 0.64 0.10 0.001 0.09 0.75
p-value multiple hyp. 0.75 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.75
Republican Share in House θ
H 0.120 -0.025 -0.128 0.011 0.093
(std. error) (0.050) (0.024) (0.063) (0.033) (0.041)
p-value single hyp. 0.02 0.31 0.04 0.73 0.02
p-value multiple hyp. 0.06 0.39 0.07 0.73 0.06
Pres Party Match in Senate 0.017 0.009 0.006 -0.004 0.026
(std. error) (0.019) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
p-value single hyp. 0.36 0.32 0.74 0.82 0.18
p-value multiple hyp. 0.60 0.60 0.82 0.82 0.60
Pres Party Match in House 0.052 0.016 0.044 0.032 0.045
(std. error) (0.020) (0.013) (0.033) (0.017) (0.024)
p-value single hyp. 0.01 0.22 0.18 0.06 0.06
p-value multiple hyp. 0.06 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.10
TABLE 3: EFFECTS ON TYPES OF GOVERNMENT GRANTS TO STATES:
Standard errors clustered by state and year in brackets. All specifcations include polynomials
in Senate vote shares and region-by-year fixed effects. See Table 2 for more details on the
control variables and sample, which are the same as in column 3 of Table 2.
REGRESSION-DISCONTINUITY MODEL WITH REGION-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS










Services OtherDependent Total Transport Total
Variable Grants Grants Defense
(1) (2) (3)
Share in Majority -0.002 -0.035 -0.032
Proposal Power α
S (0.012) (0.030) (0.032)
p-value single hyp. 0.90 0.25 0.33
Share in Majority 0.607 2.357 1.094
X Super-majority φ*
S (0.466) (1.061) (0.957)
p-value single hyp. 0.19 0.03 0.26
Cohesion φ
S 0.426 1.114 0.659
(imputed) (0.252) (0.329) (0.413)
p-value single hyp. 0.09 0.001 0.11
TABLE 4: STRUCTURAL MODEL OF MAJORITY EFFECTS 
FOR SENATE DELEGATIONS
Robust standard errors clustered by state and year are shown in parentheses.
Estimates are of the linearized model in equation (10), both with additional
controls for the shares of House state delegations in the majority and
Republican. Cohesion parameter inferred from majority share using equation
(11) with standard errors calculated using the delta method. All specifcations
include polynomials in Senate vote shares and region-by-year fixed effects.
See Table 2 for more details on the control variables and sample. .
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Democratic Control Republican Control Democratic Control Republican Control
Majority Share of Seats Democrat Share of Seats
The budget in a fiscal year is determined by the congress in session in the previous year. For example, the
Congress elected in 1994 was in session in 1995 and 1996, and determined the budget in FY1996 and FY1997.1
Figure 4a: Republican Effect on Defense Spending
Fixed-Effect and Regression-Discontinuity Estimates Compared

































































































Long dashed lines give the spending averages, controlling for observables, for Democrats to the left of the 50 percent vote-share, and
Republicans to the right. The difference at the 50 percent vote-share gives the fixed-effect estimate. The short-dash curve corresponds
to the quartic fit of residual spending on the vote-share, with the difference at the 50 percent mark corresponding to the regression-
discontinuity estimate. 95-percent confidence intervals given by the thinner dashed lines around the corresponding estimates. Circles
give cell means with a cell width of 2.5 percent of vote share, with larger circles corresponding to a greater number of observations.




















Panel estimates over time with a 20-year window
Figure 5a: Majority Effect on Transportation Spending
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Fiscal Midyear (+/- 10 Years)
Linear Panel Estimate 95% confidence interval
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Panel estimates over time with a 20-year window
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Fiscal Midyear (+/- 10 Years)
Effect from the linear model with share of Senate and House Republican representation combined.
Linear Panel Estimate 95% confidence interval
Effect from the linear model with share of Senate and House Republican representation combined.